Recapturing the ‘Reluctant Radical’

‘Reluctant radicals’ who offer uncommitted and indecisive support to populist parties are key to understanding the success of the far-right in European elections

Responding to right-wing populism is a real challenge for mainstream (i.e. non-populist) parties. At every step – from trying to understand and engage with right-wing populist voters to debating the leaders – there is a danger of coming across like the liberal elite that the right-wing populist parties and their supporters detest and mobilise against, thereby driving a further wedge between them and right-wing populist voters. In particular, arguing forcefully against right-wing populist policies such as on immigration, multiculturalism, or Europe, can give the impression of defending the status quo, and of patronising or stigmatising the voters of these parties at a time when – at least with respect to Europe – views associated with the European political elite appear to be becoming less popular by the day.

They-have-a-point

Given this challenge, it has become fashionable to argue, even in elite circles in Europe, that those who want to woo populist supporters back should do so by recognising that the populists have a serious point. On immigration, on crime, on Europe – you name it – the holders of this view think that one should respond to right-wing populism by accepting that it illuminates a fundamental truth about the policy failure of the elite political class. At one recent gathering a number of people in the room and on the panel argued that the problem is the mainstream — not the populists.  At its extreme, this view purports that right-wing populist parties are not problematic at all; just normal parties with acceptable lists of policy proposals that contain some home truths for the liberal elite. We could call this the ‘they-have-a-point’ view.

So, given the ‘they-have-a-point’ view and the accounts it reacts against, what should mainstream parties do about populism? If they forcefully uphold their beliefs in the face of dissent, they are bound to be accused of being at best ineffective and at worst sneering, patronising and anti-democratic.

On the other hand, mainstream parties could embrace the ‘they-have-a-point’ view. The problem here is not just that they would be dangerously close to abandoning core progressive principles. It is that by doing so much work to avoid patronising the voters of right-wing populist parties, they run the risk of enthusiastically agreeing with them at every opportunity. This is not a strategy of respectful debate – rather, it mollycoddles these voters, accusing those who oppose right-wing populist views of not recognising the voice of the ‘people’. This mock-idolisation of these voters is nowhere near properly engaging with them.

In Counterpoint’s new report, we offer an alternative approach that both makes clear it respects the voters of right-wing populist parties as citizens and takes a critical stance. We look at the “reluctant radicals”, the uncommitted supporters of right-wing populist parties. This group of voters is the most easy to convince to turn back to the mainstream parties. By focussing their attention on these voters, more time is spent on those supporters whom mainstream parties have a good chance of winning back.

To respectfully disagree

In our report, we emphasise that it is important to not mock or stigmatise these voters. But we also think it is important to at times challenge them. Right-wing populist parties are, we think, problematic because they give voice to or encourage xenophobic attitudes towards ethnic minority groups and because they undermine the legitimacy of representative institutions while offering no helpful or nuanced answers of their own.

Of course, mainstream politicians are fallible and have serious work to do themselves – but that does not take away from the fact that we think right-wing populism is a problematic political force. Therefore we do not think it is wrong to, when appropriate, respectfully disagree with the reluctant radical voter. At the same time we argue that this is the voter the mainstream parties will find easiest to convince.

Using electoral studies and the European Social Survey, we find that the reluctant radicals are different to the typical representations of right-wing populist voters. It is education level, rather than gender, age, or unemployment, that appears to provide the most consistent indicator of who is and who is not a reluctant radical. For instance, in France, using recent PEF data generated by CEVIPOF for the 2012 election, we find that the reluctant radicals are less likely than average to have obtained the Baccalaureate. In the Netherlands, only 10 per cent of reluctant PVV supporters have obtained a higher level vocational or university qualification, compared to 31 per cent on average. There is clearly an education divide with respect to right-wing populism – and it is a divide that naturally creates tensions.

Moreover, the reluctant radicals are more indecisive than their committed counterparts – in the Netherlands, 28 per cent decided to vote on election day in 2010, compared to 4 per cent of the committed radicals. Given the high levels of people who decided who to vote for at the last minute in the 2012 election, the fact that reluctant radicals tend to vacillate for a relatively long time stresses that they can be won back – even at the very last moment.

Going beyond the headline explanations

So where should the focus on the reluctant radicals take us? Targeting the reluctant radicals means addressing the education gap that we think is crucial with respect to right-wing populism. Policies that widen access to higher education to lower income groups and that provide more opportunities for mingling between students on vocational and academic courses could help to reduce the cleavage between the lower and higher educated. It means engaging with the ‘reluctant radicals’ through public consultations and debates to grapple with their specific concerns in a constructive manner. (This last suggestion is something Counterpoint itself is implementing in France, Finland and the Netherlands as part of the “Reluctant Radicals” project.)

But, crucially, targeting the reluctant radicals also means going beyond some of the headline explanations for right-wing populism – “anti-immigration” or “Eurosceptic”. This is what reduces the debate to an argument between those who want to maintain a liberal outlook and the growing ranks who want to say that the populists have a point. If an explanation is reduced to just these headlines, then the question gets unhelpfully framed as a choice between siding with the liberal elite and opposing them.

Pitting progressives against each other will not help to get to the roots of the problem, nor will it give policymakers effective or applicable solutions. “Anti-immigration” views or “Euroscepticism” are important for the reluctant radicals, but the roots of the problem–which give rise to these simple labels –are more complex and more culturally determined. Take the True Finns, for instance: typically characterised as Eurosceptic, we found that Europe was not the most common reason the Finnish reluctant radicals gave for voting for the party (rather, it was a desire for change). Or take France, where, as we argue in the report, a sense of disconnectedness – politically, socially and geographically – is one of the driving themes of the reluctant (Front National) radicals. A truly effective response involves a deeper understanding and confrontation of the roots of populism’s support – and in particular of the concerns of those voters who only tentatively align themselves with the populist right.

Marley Morris is a researcher at Counterpoint on the Recapturing Europe’s Reluctant Radicals project.

Sources: European Social Survey (rounds 1-5), Panel électoralfrançais 2012, Dutch Parliamentary Study 2010, Finnish National Election Study 2011. See Counterpoint's publication Recapturing the Reluctant Radical for a full list of data sources.