Rousseff’s struggle against corruption in Brazil

Brazil’s aspiration to greater international prominence demands the reform of corruption in government

The 'Indignado' movement has emerged in different forms around the world, often for entirely different reasons. While Egyptians continue to struggle to democratise a military-authoritarian state, Greeks reject adjustment measures imposed by the European Union and Chileans demand better quality and better funded public education.

Brazil's emerging citizens’ movement is small by comparison, but has achieved impressive results. Since Dilma Rousseff, who earlier this year succeeded Lula da Silva and represents the same Workers’ Party (PT), no fewer than six ministers have been forced to resign in response to accusations of corruption (except for one who was booted for sexism). While Lula used to rage against the press for uncovering corruption, the truth is that corruption has been present in Brazilian governments of all political stripes. Fernando Collor de Mello, the first elected president of Brazil’s post-military democracy, was impeached in 1992 on accusations of corruption. What has changed, therefore, is not that today there is more corruption, it is that there is less tolerance for it.

This is good news and, potentially, bad news. On the plus side, any move to reduce corruption would seem to be a positive development. In addition, the lowered tolerance on the part of the media and civil society may change the county's political culture. It may well be that Lula's impressive achievements in economic growth and poverty alleviation, via innovative social policy, have contributed to this shift in public opinion, as Brazilians move beyond basic material needs and begin to demand more from their leaders on other fronts.

In other words, if Brazil wishes to claim its place in the international system, it will have to learn to act like it. During Lula's government, Brazilian foreign policy, for example, was notoriously ambivalent towards the norms of behaviour expected from a major global player, testing its ability to leverage its newfound power amongst global outcasts like Iran. Today, the task for Brazil is to consolidate its democratic credentials on the foreign and domestic fronts. This means a change in its foreign policy strategy (of which there are already signs) and institutional strengthening at home (of which the struggle against corruption is a good example).

The problem is that public disclosures of corruption, and the resignation of six ministers, is the tip of the iceberg, and one which is much easier to deal with. The real work is to be done in Congress, where the weakness of the party system means that if the executive wishes to get its agenda passed it is forced to negotiate with individual congress people who represent some 20 political parties and diverse, often regional, interests. This interaction, over time, has become clientelistic at best, and corrupt at worst.

The difficulty facing President Rousseff is three-fold. First, the presence of some of these ministers was due to deal-making with different parties or with Lula's old guard. How will Rousseff's removal of these individuals affect her relations with these sectors?

Second, if, for the reasons stated above, corruption remains an important legislative tool, how will the emerging intolerance for these practices affect the president's ability to govern? Over the last decade Brazil has shown it has the capacity to make great strides, and it is very likely that that it will be able to resolve its emerging problems.

Finally, how will these scandals affect Brazil's international pretentions? While the impulse for Brazil's increasing prominence stems from economic power in areas such as energy - and it is unlikely that international markets will worry too much about the resignation of, say, a sports minister - there are different ways of entering the major leagues.  Surely the role Brazil seeks to play is that of a democratic, transparent, solid economic power.  Rousseff, who is strong and determined, knows that for the centre-left, transparency and ethics provide an important moral basis for deepening economic and social reforms. She knows that if she is to move forward on the latter, she cannot fail on the former.

A contribution to State of the Left, a monthly bulletin from Policy Network's Social Democracy Observatory

Robert Funk is professor of political science and deputy director at the University of Chile’s Institute for Public Affairs

Francisco Javier Díaz is a Senior Fellow at CIEPLAN