A relevant and effective British vision for the EU can be led by politicians without a drop of euro-enthusiasm in their blood
It is a commonplace that the British political and technocratic class wholly misjudged the commitment of the founding members to establish the European Community in the 1950s. The UK has paid the price ever since, as it has battled to find its place in a legal order and a set of institutions and policies based on traditions very different to our own.
Other Europeans have complained ever since that there has never been a British vision for Europe. But that is not right. There may have been no vision in the 1950s. But looking back at the history of the European Community and, latterly, the European Union, there was a period when a strong British vision shaped Europe – a vision that still has force today.
British vision shaped the Single Market in the 1980s. It is difficult now to remember how radical and ground-breaking the underlying concept was. But the Single Market Programme might easily have foundered without British commitment. Its significance is, with hindsight, very clear. Europe’s poor economic performance shows that it needs more Single Market not less.
The failure of the UK to see what would happen in the Europe of Monnet and Schuman was matched by the vision the UK showed in helping to drive forward the Single Market.
The UK showed similar vision in its response to the fall of the Berlin Wall. Almost as soon as the extent of those dramatic changes were clear, British ministers and officials were developing the concept of the Association Agreements which would lead to former members of the Warsaw Pact joining a supranational organisation whose members were committed to free enterprise, political pluralism and democracy and human rights.
The cynics will carp that the UK had no vision, that its objective was to dilute Europe not to deepen it. I don’t buy that. In the 80s and early 90s, whatever the domestic political backdrop the UK showed a deep understanding of history and the dynamics of political and economic change in Europe.
As the EU now seeks to put the euro on a sustainable footing, far-reaching change is again in prospect. Let’s assume there is a short-term fix to hold the eurozone together and that most of the worst-affected economies can find their way back to growth. Even if there is, most serious commentators recognise that without a greater degree of economic convergence, the same problems will, in time, come around again.
That greater convergence will require greater economic integration in some shape or form – by definition.
My point is not the fine detail of that integration. Nor do I see any realistic prospect that the UK might find its way into a revitalised eurozone in the longer-term. (I do, however, share the widespread view that a revitalised eurozone is strongly in the UK’s interest: the long-term success of those economies is indispensable to the long-term economic success of the UK. That point seems well understood in Westminster and Whitehall).
My point is rather that the EU is likely to emerge from the current crisis significantly changed. A revitalised eurozone is likely to be functioning in a new and significantly different way, with a new degree of interdependence and integration between its members, especially in the areas of economic policymaking that are at the heart of modern politics.
The House of Commons Scrutiny Committee is often strongly critical of the EU. But it recognises without hesitation the EU’s significance: “European legislation has a profound impact on the daily lives of the voters and people of the United Kingdom in virtually every sphere of activity”... and in a recent report identifies European economic governance as an important example of that activity.
Back to vision. We need a new vision for Britain’s place in the EU – one which recognises that the UK cannot afford to stand to one side as new and tighter forms of European integration develop under the pressure of the eurozone crisis, and that we must find a way to develop that new relationship from a position outside the eurozone. We should also recognise that, if we fail, we will let down the British voters and people whose welfare and daily lives will be so profoundly affected by the way the new dynamic of European decision-taking takes shape.
As history has shown, a relevant and effective British vision for the EU can be led by politicians without a drop of euro-enthusiasm in their blood. History has also shown that it must be informed by an understanding of the forces of change and a readiness to be pragmatic where the British interest so dictates. The 80s not the 50s show the way.
This piece is published in 'What future for Europe?', the accompanying pamphlet to Policy Network's conference on the future of the EU on 11 February 2011.
Sir John Grant was the UK permanent representative to the EU from 2003-2007