Russia can ill-afford climate cavalierism
Following this summer's extreme weather events, will Russia's leaders take global warming more seriously?
Will the heat-wave and drought that have created so much havoc in Russia
cause the leadership in that country to take climate change more
seriously? The answer is important not only for Russia itself but for
the world community. Russia is the third biggest emitter of greenhouse
gases globally, behind only China and the United States. Until recently
the Russian attitude to the threats posed by climate change was cavalier
to say the least. At an international climate change conference in
2003, then President Putin said of global warming that ‘We Russians will
spend less on fur coats’. Russia endorsed the Kyoto Protocol but as a
somewhat cynical act of Realpolitik on the part of all concerned. The
United States had refused to sign up and world leaders were desperate to
reach the target number of signatories without which the whole
endeavour would have fallen apart. As an element of the deal, Russia was
put on track to gain membership of the WTO and also allocated a large
number of credits for emissions reductions made, even though these
resulted wholly from the closing down of antiquated industrial
enterprises that had become uncompetitive after 1989.
Many in the Russian leadership believed that climate change would on
balance be beneficial for Russia. It would open up the mineral wealth of
the Arctic as the ice melts, create new shipping routes along the
country’s Northern coasts, and allow an extension of agriculture into
currently infertile areas. Taking concrete action to reduce emissions,
on the other hand, would hamper Russia’s economic growth. The disasters
of this summer should have brought home the naivete of these views.
No-one can say with certainty if they were directly influenced by
climate change. Yet they are a stark warning of what lies ahead if
global warming is not held in check. Russia is highly vulnerable to the
rising frequency and intensity of extreme weather that uncontrolled
climate change will bring in its wake. This year the country has lost
some 25% of its grain production. Flooding will be a major problem in
the future for coastal cities such as St Petersburg, as will changes in
the flow of rivers, storms, melting ice and many other hazards.
In fact, Russia’s leaders started to change their tone even before the
events of this summer. A climate plan was endorsed by the government in
2009, even if it has little to offer in the way of practical proposals.
President Medvedev announced in the run-up to the climate change
meetings in Copenhagen that Russia would accept a target of reducing its
carbon emissions by 15-20% over 1990 levels, later elevated to 20-25%.
Critics have pointed out that even the higher figures would mean that
Russian carbon emissions actually increase, because these targets will
be reached in any case because of the collapse of Russian heavy
industry. Yet they do mark a positive and potentially encouraging shift
of emphasis from the past. Medvedev has stressed the importance of
achieving greater energy efficiency, a key issue in Russia given the
profligate way in which energy is used.
Taking steps to reduce carbon emissions, and collaborating with other
nations and with the international community to do so could actually
stimulate Russian economic development rather than inhibit it. This is
not only because of the damage that unregulated climate change will
unleash on the country and hence on its economic prospects. Responding
actively to climate change and more generally to problems of
sustainability can be a major vehicle for the economic modernisation the
leadership seeks. Countries which bring up the rear in terms of
investment in low-carbon technologies and low-carbon life-styles are
likely to become progressively less competitive economically in the
future. Vanguard states, such as Germany, Portugal, China, South Korea –
and significantly, several of the leading oil and gas producing
countries in the Middle East – are already investing heavily in these
areas. Russia risks being left even further behind than at present if
it does not start to make the shift now.
Most discussion of climate change policy world-wide until recently was
carried on in terms of costs. More recently much greater emphasis has
been placed upon opportunities, and rightly so, given the considerations
just mentioned. Where there are significant costs, Russia should be
able to engage the active help of other nations and international
organisations. The emissions permits Russia holds could be put to good
use to provide funding for an active turn towards more environmentally
responsible policies. In July, after years of inaction, the government
endorsed fifteen clean energy projects, to start to make use of its
carbon credits. The rest of the world has a major interest in limiting
the damage likely to result from the effects of global warming upon
Russia’s frozen peat bogs. As they melt they will release vast amounts
of methane into the air – and methane is a greenhouse gas many times
more potent than CO2. Serious outside investment could come Russia’s way
to help develop ways of limiting this process.
Can a country that has found it very difficult to break away from its
reliance on oil and gas revenues, and to modernise other industrial
sectors, feasibly make the kind of transition I am talking about? It
will be extremely testing, and support from other countries will be
essential. The sense of emergency may soon fade when the temperature
drops again. Yet it is actually in Russia’s national and strategic
interests, not contrary to them, to treat climate change with due
seriousness. If Russia’s leaders can take this point fully on board, and
communicate it successfully to the public, the sense of fatalism in the
face of disaster coupled to bureaucratic stasis that so often inhibit
innovation in the country can be challenged.
Anthony Giddens is a former director of the London School of Economics and a Labour peer. His most recent book is "The Politics of Climate Change"
This article was originally published in The Financial Times